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* Table 1.
† H1N1, subtype based on hemagglutinin (HA) and neur-
aminidase (NA) spikes.
 Abbreviations:  CDC, Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention; HA, hemagglutinin; M, matrix; NA, neur-
aminidase; NP, nucleoprotein; NS, non-structural; PA, 
polymerase A; PB1, polymerase B1; rRT-PCR, real-time 
PCR combined with reverse transcription
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A novel pandemic influenza emerged in 2009, something that hasn’t been seen since 1977. 
The following issues will be introduced and discussed in this review: the history of influenza 
pandemics, the emergence of the novel pandemic influenza of 2009, epidemics in the south-
ern and northern hemispheres after the recognition of index cases in the United States, mor-
tality, viral characteristics, prevention in the household setting, clinical aspects, diagnosis, 
treatment and immunization.  Some questions have been answered.  However, a number of 
other questions remain.  Scientific research must follow up on these unanswered questions.
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History of pandemics before 2009*
 
Spanish influenza of 1918 (H1N1)† 
 
More than fourteen influenza pandemics have ap-
peared since 1500.  This implies that approximately 
one pandemic has occurred every 36 years.  In the 
“microbial era” (1876 to present), there were at least 
six pandemics, one each in 1889, 1918, 1957, 1968, 
1977 and 2009.  Possibly more pandemics have oc-
curred.  However, it is still not easy to document the 
long history of influenza, because a number of tech-
niques have only been developed recently.  Indeed, 
influenza viruses were not isolated until the 1930s. 
The characterization of the 1918 pandemic influ-
enza began in 1995 with the identification of a 1918 
autopsy and archeological material (Taubenberger 
and Morens, 2010). 
 The 1918 pandemic H1N1 viruses killed an 
estimated 50 million people or more worldwide. 
Mortality during the 1918 pandemic was concen-
trated on an unusually young age group.  The age 
group between 20 and 40 years was affected most 
severely.  Despite scientific and technological prog-
ress, the reasons for unexpected patterns like this 
remain obscure to date (Taubenberger and Morens, 
2010).  The high mortality associated with the 1918 
virus appears to have been largely a result of bacte-
rial pneumonia (Morens et al., 2008).  Fortunately, 
the situation has changed completely and antimicro-
bial agents are available all over the world.  Spanish 
influenza viruses still have an influence on recent 
epidemics.  Seasonal H1N1 [spread before the emer-
gence of 2009 influenza A (H1N1)] acquired poly-
merase B1 (PB1), polymerase A (PA), nucleoprotein 
(NP) and N1 genes from 1918 pandemic H1N1 
viruses.  Similarly, classic swine influenza viruses 
harbored three segments, PB2, matrix (M) and 
non-structural (NS), originating from 1918 H1N1 
viruses.
Asian influenza of 1957 (H2N2)  
 
This was a descendant of 1918 H1N1, but acquired 
three novel segments of avian-like HA (H2), NA 
(N2) and PB1 genes.  The mortality rate during 
this epidemic was as impressive as the pandemic 
in 1918.  After about two years the virus became 
seasonally epidemic and sporadic, and disappeared 
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entirely within 11 years (Taubenberger and Morens, 
2009). 
 
Hong Kong influenza of 1968 (H3N2)
 
Unlike the other two preceding pandemics, H3N2 
Hong Kong influenza viruses are still circulating 
globally.  The pandemic of 1968 was modest in its 
mortality.  As in 1957, the epidemic size became 
smaller and sporadic in its appearance.  This virus 
is a descendant of the H2N2-type virus with two 
avian-like segments of HA (H3) and PB1.  It has 
been suggested that the relative mildness of the 
1968 pandemic resulted in the retention of the NA 
segment harbored by the strains that had circulated 
previously.  Most of the population had at least 
partial immunity to this NA (Taubenberger and 
Morens, 2009). 
 
Russian influenza of 1977 (H1N1)
 
This reemergence in 1977 is unexplainable and may 
represent reintroduction to humans from a labora-
tory source (Zimmer and Burke, 2009). 
  
Emergence of novel influenza A  
viruses in 2009 
 
From pigs to humans
 
Before the emergence of novel influenza viruses 
spreading among humans, there was sporadic in-
fection with triple-reassortant swine influenza A 
(H1) viruses from pigs to human (one-way flow) in 
the United States.  Eleven cases of sporadic human 
infections with triple-reassortant swine influenza 
A viruses, were recognized from December 2005 
through February 2009 until just before the epi-
demic of swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) among 
humans.  Median age was 10 years (from 16 months 
to 48 years).  Nine cases had exposure to pigs.  The 
range of suspected incubation period was 3 to 9 
days.  Major symptoms were fever (90%), cough 
(100%), headache (60%) and diarrhea (30%).  Four 
patients were hospitalized and two of these were un-
der invasive mechanical ventilation.  All recovered 
eventually from their illness (Shinde et al., 2009). 
The severity and main symptoms of this disease 
seemed similar to that of the novel influenza that 
emerged and caused a pandemic in 2009. 
 
Among humans
 
On April 17, 2009, the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) in the United States deter-
mined two cases of febrile respiratory illness occur-
ring in children living in two different counties in 
southern California.  Both of these children were in-
fected with swine influenza A (H1N1) viruses.  Nei-
ther of these children had contacts with pigs nor with 
each other.  The source of the infection remains un-
known.  The lack of known exposure to pigs in the 
two cases increases the possibility that human-to-
human transmission of this new influenza virus had 
occurred.  A couple of days later, the CDC reported 
six additional cases.  Four were in California but the 
other two were in Texas, far from California.  These 
six additional patients were infected by similar 
strains of swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) viruses 
identified in the two index cases (CDC, 2009b).  As 
a result, a total of 642 swine-origin influenza cases 
were identified in 41 states in the United States until 
May 5.  The ages ranged widely, but 60% were 18 
years of age or younger.  The most common symp-
toms were fever (94%), cough (92%) and sore throat 
(66%).  Similar to the pig-to-human cases, 25% of 
patients had diarrhea (Dawood et al., 2009).
Table 1.  Influenza history and the advancement 
of medical technology
 
Year Epidemics and other important medical events
 
1918 Emergence of Spanish influenza (H1N1)
1928 Discovery of penicillin by A. Fleming
1957 Emergence of Asian influenza (H2N2)
1968 Emergence of Hong Kong influenza (H3N2)
1977 Emergence of Russian influenza (H1N1)
1987 Discovery of PCR
2000 Zanamivir (drug infused by inhalation)
2001 Oseltamivir (oral drug)
 General use of antigen detection kits
2009 Emergence of 2009 influenza (H1N1)
2010 Peramivir (drip infusion therapy drug)
 Laninavir (long-acting drug)
Guan et al., 2010; Taubenberger and Morens, 2010.
43
Pandemic influenza
 Genomic analysis of the 2009 influenza A 
(H1N1) virus [2009 A(H1N1) virus hereafter] in hu-
mans indicates that it is closely related to common 
reassortant swine influenza A viruses.  The segment 
coding for the polymerase complex (PB2, PB1, PA), 
HA, NP and NS show high similarity to triple-reas-
sortant swine viruses harbored by North American 
swine.  The reassortment of these three segments 
was generated in swine around 1990 and infected 
humans sporadically since then as described above. 
The segment coding for the NA and M originated 
from the strains harbored by Eurasian swine (Fig. 1) 
(Smith et al., 2009; Trifonov et al., 2009). 
 
From humans to pigs
 
The evolution of influenza A viruses seems to indi-
cate that viruses among pigs change to adapt to hu-
mans, and that reversal flow (human-to-pig) doesn’t 
happen.  However, a reverse transmission event hap-
pened from a human to a pig after the emergence of 
the swine-origin influenza viruses.  In May 2009, 
2009 A(H1N1) viruses were confirmed in Thai-
land from a person who had a history of travel to 
Mexico.  Shortly after this was noted, transmission 
from humans to pigs was discovered on pig farms 
(Sreta et al., 2010).
Fig. 1.  Reassortment events leading to the emergence of 2009 A(H1N1) virus.  Gene segments are indicated by PB2, 
PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, M and NS from top to bottom within the viral particles.  The 2009 A(H1N1) viruses contained 
the 6 segments originating from triple-reassortant swine strains (PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, and NS) and the 2 from 
Eurasian swine strains (NA, M).  The HA segment of a triple-reassortant swine strain was replaced by the one in a clas-
sical swine strain around 1998.  H1N1, subtype based on HA and NA spikes; HA, hemagglutinin; M, matrix; NA, neur-
aminidase; NP, nucleoprotein; NS, non-structural; PA, polymerase A; PB, polymerase B.
44
S. Kageyama
 
Epidemics in the southern and 
northern hemispheres
 
Just after the index cases of novel influenza were 
recognized in southern California, countries in the 
southern hemisphere such as Australia were striken 
by a strong influenza epidemic (Baker, Kelly and 
Wilson, 2009).  This happened four months earlier 
than the epidemic onset in Japan.  In New South 
Wales the most populous state of Australia, the 
epidemic lasted from late June to early September 
(New South Wales Public Health Network, 2009). 
At least one quarter of the population and one-third 
of children experienced influenza-like illnesses 
(Muscatello et al., 2011).  The virus affected the 
younger generation and caused considerable mor-
bidity, 8.5-fold, as compared with seasonal influ-
enza in the previous five seasons (Australian Gov-
ernment Department of Health and Ageing, 2009). 
However, the fatality rate was not considerably high 
and even low (0.5–1.5%) for laboratory-confirmed 
influenza cases caused by the 2009 A(H1N1) virus 
(Falagas et al., 2011).  
 The epidemic trend shifted to the northern 
hemisphere from September to October of that year. 
Unlike the epidemic in the southern hemisphere, the 
epidemic size of influenza caused by 2009 A(H1N1) 
viruses did not seem higher than those of regular 
seasonal influenza.  This lower morbidity in the 
northern hemisphere is presumably attributed to the 
new vaccine preparation for this pandemic.  Except 
for the epidemic size, findings are in accordance 
with those gained during the 2009 winter season in 
the southern hemisphere.  The novel influenza oc-
curred more in the younger generation as compared 
to the seasonal one (Falagas et al., 2011).  Most of 
the epidemic was caused by 2009 A(H1N1) viruses 
while a few seasonal viral strains were detected. 
From April 2009 to June 12, 2010, US-CDC per-
formed antigenic characterization of the 67,022 
subtype-A viruses and identified 34 cases of sea-
sonal influenza A (H1N1) (Russian flu type, 0.1%), 
72 cases of seasonal influenza A (H3N2) (Hong 
Kong flu type, 0.1%) and 66,916 cases of the 2009 
A(H1N1) virus (99.8%).  
 
Mortality
The World Health Organization stated that an as-
sessment of the severity of a pandemic is complex, 
and a single assessment of severity may not be rele-
vant or helpful to countries at the global level (World 
Health Organization, 2009).  However, a graded se-
ries of responses such as closing schools and other 
public venues, are required for addressing influenza 
pandemics.  The United States defined the pandem-
ic severity index.  It is calibrated to the case fatality 
ratio.  Mild responses are prescribed for a strain 
resembling seasonal influenza, which kills around 
0.1% of infected individuals, whereas stringent mea-
sures are implemented for a very severe pandemic 
with a rate of 2% or more (Lipsitch et al., 2009).  A 
case-fatality ratio of about 0.5% was documented in 
one report (Nishiura, 2010).  However, an estimation 
of the number of infections is difficult as compared 
to fatal cases.  Indeed, the case fatality ratios were 
estimated to be 0.4 in the United Kingdom (Pebody 
et al., 2010) and 0.11 to 0.15 in Germany (Wilking 
et al., 2010).  Similarly, variation could be observed 
in the fatality ratios per one million inhabitants: 7.6 
in the United Kingdom, 3.1 in Germany, 7.0 in the 
United States, 13.7 in Canada, 3.7 in the Nether-
lands, 1.8 in Belgium, 4.8 in Austria, 6.3 in Spain, 
5.1 in France (Wilking et al., 2010) and 0.7 in Japan 
(Kamigaki and Oshitani, 2009)
 
Viral load, shedding/spreaders 
and stability
The median incubation time was 2 days (range, 1–7) 
and the duration of fever was typically 3 days (range, 
1–11) (Cao et al., 2009).  Viral load on the throat 
swab was inversely correlated with the number of 
days after the onset of fever.  It was maintained at 
a high level over the first 3 days during the febrile 
period and then decreased over time.  Patients with 
pneumonia had a higher viral load than those with 
upper respiratory tract infection (Li et al., 2010). 
 Median viral shedding time after the onset of 
symptoms was 6 to 9 days (Cao et al., 2009; Li et 
al., 2010; Ling et al., 2010).  Another meta-analysis 
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reported that the average duration of shedding over 
375 participants was 4.80 days (95% confidence in-
terval: 4.31, 5.29) (Carrat et al., 2008).  Independent 
risk factors for prolonged viral shedding included 
younger age, male sex and delayed treatment (Cao 
et al., 2009).  Younger patients (< 13 years old) had 
a longer viral shedding time than older people (≥ 13 
years old) (11 days versus 7 days) (Li et al., 2010). 
Asymptomatic individuals composed one-third of 
total infections (Carrat et al., 2008), and caused 
30% to 50% of secondary infections although 
symptomatic patients were the main viral spread-
ers (Carrat et al., 2008).  Another report estimated 
a lower transmission rate from asymptomatic indi-
viduals (14%) (Lau et al., 2010).
 Influenza virus transmits through droplets 
(particle diameter, > 5 µm) and direct (physical con-
tact)/indirect contact (hands, instruments, etc.).  The 
knowledge is supported by a number of experimen-
tal and epidemiological findings.  The transmission 
through the air-borne route (particle diameter < 5 
µm, i.e., transmission over long distance) might be 
unlikely for human influenza virus infection.  Stud-
ies examining the particles produced during natural 
coughing have shown that more than 99.9% of the 
aerosol volume is composed of particles with a di-
ameter greater than 8 µm (Brankston et al., 2007).
 Influenza viruses can survive in and be de-
tected from aerosol for up to 24 h at low levels 
of relative humidity and 60 min at higher levels. 
Transmission of viruses has been documented to 
occur from a surface to the hands of volunteers in 
sufficient quantities.  The contaminated surfaces 
were capable of supporting viable virus transfer 
for a substantially long period (up to 2 h).  Viruses 
were detected on 23% and 53% of objects in a day-
care center in the autumn and spring, respectively. 
Approximately 60% of objects swabbed in the 
homes of sick children were contaminated with 
viruses.  Although direct and indirect contact for 
viral transmission is important, no study has shown 
that contact with contaminated surfaces could result 
in transmission.  Further studies should be done 
(Brankston et al., 2007).
  
  
  
Prevention measures in daily life: 
wearing masks and washing hands
Killingley and colleagues documented that remark-
ably little is known about models of transmission 
of the influenza virus, and understanding the basic 
science of influenza transmission is key to the de-
velopment of evidence-based policies for prevention 
and control of infections.  The US Institute of Medi-
cine, the European Center for Disease Control and 
the World Health Organization have all prioritized 
understanding the models of influenza transmis-
sion as a vital requirement for pandemic planning 
(Killingley et al., 2011). 
 Researchers in Egypt have assessed the effect 
of a hand-hygiene campaign and introduced a ran-
domized control trial at 30 schools over a 12-week 
period, while 30 different schools acted as controls. 
School children in the intervention group were re-
quired to wash hands twice each day.  Incidence 
of laboratory-confirmed influenza (both A and B 
strains) was reduced by 50% in the intervention ver-
sus control groups (P < 0.0001) (Talaat et al., 2011). 
 Another research group undertook a primary 
prevention study in the United States.  Volunteers 
were divided into three groups in this study.  Vol-
unteers in the first group were assigned to wear 
surgical masks (daily for 3.5 h on average), while 
those in the second group wore masks and washed 
hands.  The rest of the volunteers were in the con-
trol group.  The trial lasted for six weeks.  Influen-
za-like illnesses fell by 35% to 51% in the second 
group and by 28% to 35% in the first group (Aiello 
et al., 2010).  In households, similar studies have 
been done.  One study reported that intervention 
within 36 h of symptom onset reduced transmission 
significantly (adjusted odds ratio 0.33) (Cowling 
et al., 2009).  Another study reported that risk of 
influenza-like illness was reduced by 60% to 80% 
in a subgroup of adults who used their masks most 
of the time (MacIntyre et al., 2009). 
 
Clinical aspects
Infection with the 2009 H1N1 virus causes a broad 
spectrum of clinical syndromes, from afebrile up-
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per respiratory illness to severe viral pneumonia. 
Fever (>38 ˚C) has been the most frequent symptom 
(81%–100%) among hospitalized patients.  Frequen-
cies of coughing (69%–100%), dyspnea (43%–100%, 
more in children) and sore throat (4%–31%) follow. 
Gastrointestinal symptoms (including nausea, vom-
iting and diarrhea) occur more commonly than in 
seasonal influenza.  Rapid progression is common, 
typically starting on day 4 to 5 after the onset of 
illness, and intubation is often required within 24 h 
after admission (Bautista et al., 2010).   
 
Diagnosis and treatment
 
In 2009, CDC conducted an evaluation of the rapid 
tests for influenza diagnosis.  The results showed 
that overall sensitivity was low (40%–69%) among 
all specimens tested and declined substantially as 
virus levels decreased.  This low sensitivity of the 
rapid diagnosis system suggests that a negative re-
sult could not rule out an infection with novel influ-
enza A (H1N1) virus although a positive result can 
be used for the deciding to treat.  This interpretation 
suggests that treatment should be considered even 
in antigen-negative cases, depending on clinical sus-
picion, underlying medical conditions, severity of 
illness, and risk of complications.  The test of real-
time PCR combined with reverse transcription (rRT-
PCR) and/or virus isolation should be performed if 
further definitive determination is required.  An M 
gene can be used for the target of rRT-PCR of influ-
enza A (CDC, 2009a).
 We have mainly used two anti-influenza 
drugs, oseltamivir and zamanivir to date.  Both 
agents inhibit the neuraminidase working process. 
Detailed knowledge of both pharmacokinetics 
and pharmacodynamics of oseltamivir after oral 
administration has been summarized elsewhere 
(Widmer et al., 2010).  Since the outbreak of the 
2009 A(H1N1) virus, a number of cases of infec-
tions have been reported with oseltamivir-resistant 
influenza viruses.  These strains typically contain 
a single amino acid substitution at 275 (H275Y) of 
the viral neuraminidase.  The mutation of H275Y 
could emerge within 48 h therapy (Inoue et al., 
2010).  The H275Y variant virus can be transmitted, 
replicated and cause disease (Le et al., 2010).  For-
tunately, H275Y variants remained mostly suscep-
tible to zanamivir.  However, there emerged a 2009 
A(H1N1) virus resistant not only to oseltamivir, but 
to zanamivir in a immunosuppressive host due to 
allogeneic transplantation.  This virus even resisted 
peramivir (a long acting neuraminidase inhibitor) 
(van der Vries et al., 2010).  These recent increases 
in drug-resistant influenza virus variants accelerates 
the need for the development of new drugs targeting 
other molecules and with different kinetics (Boltz et 
al., 2010).  
 
Prevention: non-pharmaceutical mea-
sures and immunization
 
It has been recognized that development of strate-
gies for mitigating the severity of a new influenza 
pandemic is a top global public health priority.  In-
fluenza prevention and containment strategies can 
be considered under the categories of non-pharma-
ceutical measures, antiviral treatment and vaccine 
as partly described above.  Mathematical models 
have suggested that school closure can reduce peak 
attack rates by up to 40%, in which case isolation or 
household quarantine has a significant impact and 
that the treatment of clinical cases can reduce trans-
mission.  Household-based prophylaxis coupled 
with reactive school closure could reduce clinical 
attack rates by 40% to 50% (Ferguson et al., 2006).
 Vaccination is the primary strategy for the pre-
vention and control of influenza.  Influenza vaccine 
is trivalent, and formulated to contain three strains 
representing influenza A (H1N1), A (H3N2) and 
B.  When human 2009 H1N1 viruses were identi-
fied in the spring of 2009, vaccine manufacturers 
were already in the process of annual production 
of seasonal influenza vaccine for the 2009 to 2010 
season.  It was then decided that the production of a 
vaccine against the novel virus would be produced 
in addition to the seasonal vaccine.  For the im-
mediate future, priorities have been established for 
overcoming the rate-limiting steps in the production 
of inactivated vaccines (Lambert and Fauci, 2010). 
The immunogenicity of an influenza vaccine is 
currently measured by its capacity to induce func-
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tional neutralizing HA-specific antibodies in serum, 
which have been proved to provide acceptable pro-
tection against influenza.  Healthy adults show 70% 
to 90% protection against influenza illness upon 
conventional immunization, if there is a good anti-
genic match between the vaccine and the circulate 
influenza strains.  However, the protective capacity 
differs depending on age and health status of popu-
lation groups.  Individuals at the highest risk for 
severe seasonal influenza infections are the elderly, 
as well as adults and children suffering of chronic 
health conditions.  Conventional vaccine protects 
only 50% to 70% of individuals belonging to these 
population groups.  Lower efficacy of vaccination 
in the elderly might be related to decreased immune 
function, and the immune systems of small chil-
dren differs from adults in that they have generated 
strong immune response through frequent exposure 
to influenza viruses for many years.  The challenge 
for future manufacturing of inter-pandemic influ-
enza vaccine is concerned with the improvement of 
immunization strategies for individuals belonging 
to such high-risk populations (Fichera et al., 2009).
 Although an older population has some dis-
advantage due to the immunological deterioration, 
they have had the advantage of pre-existing cross-
reactive antibodies to 2009 A(H1N1) viruses ac-
quired during the aging process through infection 
and/or immunizations.  On the other hand, persons 
under 30 years have shown little evidence of cross-
reactive antibodies to the 2009 pandemic viruses 
because the immunization of recent seasonal influ-
enza vaccines induced little or no cross-reactive an-
tibody response to 2009 A(H1N1) viruses (Hancock 
et al., 2009). 
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